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According to Keen and Hackathorn, "A central theme in decision
support is that one cannot improve something one does not understand.
The act of 'supporting' a manager implies a meshing of analytic tools
into his or her existing activities" (Keen and Hackathorn, 1979:4).
Similarly, the development of a computer-based executive support
system requires an understanding of what it is that executives do.
Unfortunately, there is no position in the organizational hierarchy
that is less understood than that of the senior executive. Virtually
all existing studies of senior executives at work have been comprised
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either of small samples or have covered very limited periods of time
-- or both. What top managers actually do remains somewhat of a
mystery.
The purpose of this paper is to review the existing literature on
executive work and to note areas of agreement between the literature
and the practice which we have observed in our recent research
(De Long/Rockart, 1984, 1986) in the area of computer-based executive
support systems (ESS). Studies of more than 25 corporations with some
type of ESS in place suggest that currently executives are trying
to do three things with these systems:
1. Implement applications generally associated with office
automation, including systems such as electronic mail and
word processing.
2. Improve systems which support the organization's planning and
control processes.
3. Develop, clarify, or enhance the individual manager's mental
model of the firm's business environment.
1. An average of slightly less than a day was spent in each
organization. An interview outline guided discussions with technical
and staff people involved with the systems, as well as executive
users. The interview outline was used primarily as an evocative
device aimed at having the subject describe his or her impressions of
the system. Emphasis was placed on the reasons for, and value of the
systems, as well as their design elements and implementation
characteristics.
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Research which seeks to develop categorizations like these is
difficult at best. The literature on executives implies a need for
many different types of executive support systems, as well as none at
all. As researchers we must take into account Weick's (1984) warning
against seeing only those facts which support our own implicit
models. Nevertheless, the field evidence does point toward the three
major uses of ESS noted above, and the literature provides a solid
case for them.
To illustrate that case, this paper is divided into three parts.
First, we will review the work of those theorists who provide insights
into the work of senior executives. In particular, we will focus on
three researchers -- Mintzberg, Kotter and Isenberg -- whose work is
aimed specifically at understanding the role of the senior line
executive. We have also drawn heavily on the work of two other
researchers -- Anthony and Jaques -- whose findings provide
particularly useful insights into top management work with regard to
the use of ESS. The second part of the paper provides some evidence
from our field research to illustrate the major uses noted above. The
final section relates the research on executive work outlined in part
one to the three types of ESS identified by the field research.
There are several well known conceptions of the executive's job.
Each one provides a different perspective. Mintzberg's model of
management roles is probably the best known characterization of the
activities of senior executives. Anthony's planning and control
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framework offers a functional view, while Kotter's studies of top
management work provide a useful behaviorally-oriented framework for
studying ESS. All three of these conceptions, however, merely
describe what can be perceived of executive work by an external
observer. They lack a cognitive perspective. Therefore, we will also
draw heavily on work by Jaques and Isenberg for several concepts that
focus on cognition as a major aspect of the management function.
Other contributions to the relatively sparse academic literature on
senior executives will also be cited where appropriate.
Mintzberg's Activities View
Mintzberg is best known for his role theory which, based on his
study of five chief executives, categorizes executive activities --
what top managers do -- into ten distinct roles. Mintzberg's (1973)
research on the work of top management is rooted in a view of
managerial research that believes in systematic analysis of the
characteristics and content of managers' work activities. The father
of this school is Sune Carlson (1951) whose study of nine Swedish
executives is considered the first significant empirical study of
managerial work. Carlson used a diary method to gather data on the
characteristics of executive work, i.e., time allocations,
communication patterns, etc.
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Mintzberg, however, relied on structured observation of five
executives to develop a description of the content of managerial
work. He subsequently categorized executive activities into ten
distinct roles, a categorization that probably remains the most
influential framework defining the work of senior executives.
Mintzberg's ten roles are divided into three groups: interpersonal,
informational, and decisional. The roles, and the fundamental
activities carried out by the executive in each, are:
Interpersonal Roles
Figurehead -- Carries out a symbolic role as head of the
organization, performing routine duties of a legal or social
nature.
Leader -- In the most widely recognized managerial duty,
responsible for motivation and activation of subordinates, as
well as staffing, training, promoting.
Liaison -- Develops and maintains personal network of
external contacts who provide information and favors.
Informational Roles
Monitor -- Seeks and receives a wide variety of special
information to develop a thorough understanding of the
organization and the environment. In this role, the executive
serves as the nerve center of internal and external information
about the organization.
Disseminator -- Transmits information received from
outsiders or from subordinates to other members of the
organization. Information ranges from factual information to
value statements designed to guide subordinates in decision
making.
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Spokesman -- Communicates information to outsiders on the
organization's plans, policies, actions, results, etc.
Decisional Roles
Entrepreneur -- Searches the organization and environment
for opportunities and initiates "improvement projects" to bring
about change; supervises design of certain projects as well.
Disturbance Handler -- Responsible for corrective action
when the organization faces important, unexpected disturbances.
Resource Allocator -- Allocates organizational resources of
all kinds.
Negotiator -- Represents the organization in major
negotiations. (Mintzberg, 1973)
Working in the decade prior to the rise of end user computing,
Mintzberg, of course, saw no direct use of computers by the executives
he studied. His focus was on the observable characteristics of
executive work. He reported brevity of attention to any activity,
fragmentation of effort, and an emphasis on verbal communication.
Observing very little use of hard, quantifiable data in his research,
he wrote:
I was struck during my study by the fact that the executives
I was observing -- all very competent by any standard -- are
fundamentally indistinguishable from their counterparts of a
hundred years ago (or a thousand years ago, for that matter).
The information they need differs, but they seek it in the same
way -- by word of mouth. Their decisions concern modern
technology, but the procedures they use to make them are the same
as the procedures of the nineteenth-century manager. Even the
computer, so important for the specialized work of
theorganization, has apparently had no influence on the work
procedures of general managers. In fact, the manager is in a
kind of loop, with increasingly heavy work pressures but no aid
forthcoming from management science. (1975:54)
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Mintzberg saw no executive computer use a decade ago, and his
findings are often used to argue against automation in the executive
suite. When looked at more carefully, however, Mintzberg's model
actually does disclose reasons why information technology might be
used to support many of the executive's roles. This is because of the
pervasive impact of information on virtually all of the roles. The
monitoring and disturbance handling roles, for example, both represent
activities where access to hard, structured information is extremely
useful and, in organizations of any size, readily available today. In
carrying out both of these roles, the presence of monthly, weekly and
sometimes daily reports, most often in paper form, is quite usual.
Further, Mintzberg says that executives use the information they
collect in four ways: (1) to disseminate it to others; (2) to develop
value positions for the firm; (3) to identify business problems and
opportunities; and (4) "to develop mental images -- 'models' of how
his organization and its environment function..." (1973:70)
Mintzberg contends that these mental models help the executive
deal with the complexity inherent in his or her job. He says, "In
effect, the manager absorbs information that continually bombards him
and forms it into a series of mental models -- of the internal
workings of his organization, the behavior of subordinates, the trends
in the organization's environment, the habits of associates, and
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so on. When choices must be made, these models can be used to test
alternatives." (1973:89)
He concludes, "The effectiveness of the manager's decisions is
largely dependent on the quality of his models." (1973:90)
Mintzberg not only recognizes the importance of mental models,
but also acknowledges the potential role of computer support in
enriching these models. He states, "One way to improve the manager's
models is to expose him systematically to the best available
conceptual understanding of the situations he faces. A key role of
the management scientist could be to put good models into the
manager's head....The manager will develop models of these things
anyway; by explicit focus on them, the management scientist can help
ensure that the models are the best ones possible." (1973:157)
Anthony's Planning and Control Framework
An expanded view of the executive's monitoring role is clearly
evident in Anthony's model of planning and control (1965), which
provides a functional view of management. His framework consists of
three categories:
Strategic planning -- is the process of deciding on
objectives of the organization, on changes in these objectives,
on the resources used to attain these objectives, and on the
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policies that are to govern the acquisition, use, and disposition
of these resources.
Management control -- is the process by which managers
assure that resources are obtained and used effectively and
efficiently in the accomplishment of the organization's
objectives.
Operational control -- is the process of assuring that
specific tasks are carried out effectively and efficiently.
(1965:16-18)
Anthony concedes that the lines between his three categories are
to some extent blurred and that certain activities will not fit
clearly under any of the three headings. He does point out, however,
that activities listed under strategic planning are heavily oriented
toward planning activities, that those labelled management control are
a combination of both planning and control, and that operational
control activities are almost exclusively concerned with control.
Examples of activities that fall under the three major framework
headings are shown in Exhibit I.
Exhibit I
Strategic Planning
Planning the
organization
Setting financial
policies
Acquiring a new
division
Note: adapted from
Management Control
Planning and monitoring
staff levels
Working capital plan-
ning and control
Measuring, appraising,
and improving manage-
ment performance
Anthony (1965)
Operational Control
Controlling hiring
Controlling credit
extension
Measuring, appraising,
and improving workers'
efficiency
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For ESS purposes, it is Anthony's concept of "management control"
that is most significant. He contends that the several activities it
includes are carried out, in part, by senior management. In practice,
managerial control is observable in budgeting, sales quotas, personnel
control, and other widely-used fundamental management systems
involving both planning and control activities.
Anthony's model is drawn from the broader school of cybernetic
theory developed by Weiner (1948) and Beer (1959). It is really a
cybernetic model representing a feedback loop.
The basic steps in the feedback loop are shown in Exhibit II:
Exhibitll I"D~hbtl 
The reasons for each step are fairly obvious. Control without a
knowledge of desirable results is meaningless (Merchant, 1985), so
management needs a plan. But a plan without follow-up is also of
il____C____s___^(___ ·_LII_ _III
IIIIIIII
I
I
I
I
I
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little value. Thus, planning and control are intimately joined in
both a pure cybernetic model and in the world of management practice.
This framework of planning and control is, of course, not a
complete model of management. It offers only a limited perspective on
the work of top managers because it focuses on just one of the several
roles -- monitoring -- that Mintzberg attributes to executive work.
But it is clearly a critical role, and one in which information plays
a vital part.
More recently, others have worked to provide more specific and
alternate views of the control process (in which planning in all cases
is either explicit or implicit). Best known among these are Merchant
(1985), who expands on diverse measures for results, actions, and
personnel controls; Ouchi (1979) who builds on the work of Thompson
(1967) and approaches the control process from an organizational
perspective; and Williamson (1975), whose economic theory of markets
and hierarchies dictates a control strategy based on agency theory.
Although their various theoretical and/or pragmatic approaches differ,
all, like Anthony, acknowledge the need for information to control and
organize.
Kotter's Process View
While Mintzberg clearly has an activities view of executive work,
and Anthony offers a functional model, Kotter (1982) presents more of
I ~  ~ ~ ~ ~ -- ---------------
- 12 -
a process model. Using data gathered from in-depth interviews and
structured observation of 15 general managers, Kotter concludesthat
executives' efforts center around two key processes: (1) agenda
setting and (2) network building.
Agendas are loosely connected goals and plans, addressing a wide
range of financial, product/market, and organizational issues.
According to Kotter, they cover short, medium, and long-term
responsibilities (1982b:160). Drawing from his research on 15 general
managers (GMs), Kotter notes:
...the GMs' agendas always included goals, priorities,
strategies, and plans that were not in the written documents.
This is not to say that the formal plans and the GMs agendas were
incompatible; generally, they were rather consistent. They were
just different in at least three important ways. First, the
formal plans tended to be written mostly in terms of detailed
financial numbers; the GMs' agendas tended to be less detailed in
financial objectives and more detailed in strategies and plans
for the business or the organization. Second, formal plans
usually focused entirely on the short and moderate run (three
months to five years); GM agendas tended to focus a bit more on a
broader time frame, including the immediate future (1-30 days)
and the longer run (5-20 years). Finally, formal plans tended to
be more explicit, rigorous, and logical, especially regarding how
various financial items fit together; GM agendas often contained
lists of goals or plans that were not as explicitly connected.
(1982a:61)
According to Kotter, the other major management function is
network building. This means developing cooperative relationships
with all those people who may play a role in providing information for
development and implementation of the executive's emerging agenda.
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The network consists not only of direct subordinates and superiors,
but also of many other people at all levels in the manager's
organization. Included are external suppliers, customers,
politicians, bankers, and others, whose support can be helpful in
defining and implementing the executive's agenda. The executive's
network often includes hundreds or even thousands of people with a
variety of types and intensities of relationships.
Kotter's concept of network building provides a very strong
indication of the importance of communication to executives. To
Kotter, communication, either formal or informal, is half the game.
Mintzberg, Anthony and Kotter all have useful conceptions of top
management work, but they leave out one important element --
cognition. How do executives think about what they do? This is
critical because many believe that the primary difference between top
executives and middle managers is in their cognitive approaches to
work.
Jaques' Cognitive View
Jaques presents one cognitive view of management (1976). His
stratified systems theory of organizations identifies seven levels
common to bureaucratic hierarchies, with the boundaries between each
level, or stratum, representing qualitative shifts in the nature of
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work at each level. The seven strata are defined by relative shifts
in the "time span of discretion." Jaques says that time span of
discretion is established by measuring the task with the longest
target completion time in the role (1976:109). His seven levels of
work in organizations are shown in Exhibit III. Also described here
are the primary activities of each level in the organization from shop
floor to chairman of the largest corporations. The activities
represent the primary tasks at each level that differentiate it from
the level below.
Paralleling the different time horizons with which individuals
can work, according to Jaques, are differences in ' levels of
abstraction, as represented in the last column of Exhibit III. He
uses abstraction in the sense of the ability to work on more general
problems without the need for direct contact with specific examples or
situations. Jaques postulates that "how any two people perceive the
same problem or activity will be different according to the
differences in their level of abstraction" (1976:139).
The difference in the "quality of abstraction" is particularly
noticeable between levels three and four, the latter being the first
level of general management. The first three levels of abstraction
represent work that involves relatively concrete types of thinking.
"Perceptual-motor concrete" is a mode of work that involves direct
perceptual contact with the physical output, such as a stockroom clerk
_···E.-IIIII_-_L-__-- -
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filling an order, or a secretary typing a memo. The second level,
"imaginal concrete," requires the use of imagination in constructing a
project, but deals with projects for which the final output can be
visualized in concrete terms. A foreman at this level would, for
example, plan and implement a training program for workers who will
operate new machines being installed. The third level of abstraction
is "imaginal scanning" which involves a position such as sales
manager, in which it is impossible to fully comprehend an entire area
of responsibility at once, although the whole can still be mentally
scanned, one piece at a time.
Jaques emphasizes that between levels three and four there is a
"profound change in the quality of abstraction used in carrying out
tasks: it is a change from the concrete to the abstract mode of
thought and work." (1976:147) He also says, "The qualitative jump
from level three [departmental manager] to level four (general
management] is that at level four neither the output nor the project
can be forseen in concrete terms, even by imaginal scanning. The
project cannot be completely constructed. It remains a combination of
a conscious subjective picture, imcomplete in itself, whose specific
total form and content are unconsciously intuitively sensed but cannot
quite be consciously grasped." (1976:149)
The fifth level of abstraction is called the level of "intuitive
theory" because it is based on the intuitive theories an individual
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has developed out of his or her experience. Jaques says executives at
this level are preoccupied with shaping the future and they tend to
delegate current operations based on plans and policies already
specified.
Jaques concedes that above level five insufficient empirical work
has been done to characterize the qualitative differences in the modes
of work at levels six and seven. He does say, however, that where
technology allows, there is a shift away from coordinating the
activities of subordinates to management by policy setting. Thus,
where levels six and seven exist, the management of organizations
becomes the creation of new organizations as enterprises are
restructured into a series of independent subsidiaries.
Isenberg's Cognitive Overview
In an unpublished work, Managerial Thinking: An Inquiry Into How
Senior Managers Think, Isenberg argues that "managerial cognition" is
a critical variable for understanding the management process.
Unfortunately, he points out, virtually all the major studies of
executive work have treated cognitive capabilities as a background
issue. One reason for this lack of attention is that there is no one
well-accepted cognitive view of management. Acknowledging this,
Isenberg provides multiple perspectives on executive cognition. Three
of these are particularly informative.
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One cognitive perspective identified by Isenberg is "Manager as
Decision Maker." This has been a popular concept of management,
particularly among those seeking to support executives with
traditional decision support systems technology (DSS). Isenberg,
however, finds this conception flawed.
He contends that rarely can the actual moment of decision be
observed. Executives do not usually make major decisions as
individuals by choosing from a set of predetermined alternatives. In
fact, able executives make very few decisions and virtually none that
have not been extensively worked upon over a period of time by staff
and subordinate line managers. Isenberg cites Barnard's (1938)
familiar passage to support his point:
The fine art of executive decision consists in not deciding
questions that are not now pertinent, in not deciding
prematurely, in not making decisions that cannot be made
effective, and in not making decisions others should make.
(p.194)
Isenberg's view finds support in the work of a wide range of
researchers, e.g., Simon (1957) and Keen (1976). The point is that
decision support systems are designed to support decision makers in
semi-structured tasks. Most executive decisions, however, involve
problems that are unstructured, very complex, and influenced by many
people. Isenberg, with support from researchers like Simon and Keen,
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leads one away from thinking of the "executive as decision maker" as a
fundamental design strategy for senior management systems.
A second cognitive perspective identified by Isenberg, and useful
in comprehending the role of executive support systems, is "Manager as
Sensemaker." This conception focuses on how managers impose cognitive
structures on their environments. Using this cognitive model, Brief
and Downey (1983) drew on case studies to argue that Henry Ford and
Alfred Sloan's differing mental models resulted in very different
business strategies and organizational structures at Ford and General
Motors. In similar fashion, Donaldson and Lorsch (1983) studied the
goal formulation and strategic decision making processes in a dozen
Fortune 500 companies. They found that "strategic decisions are not
the product of simple economic logic alone. Because these decisions
often depend on forecasts of future events, they involve considerable
uncertainty and ambiguity. To analyze these complexities, top
managers draw upon their experience and judgement -- judgement that
has been shaped by the shared beliefs passed on to them by their
predecessors." (Donaldson and Lorsch, 1983:9). This concordance of
shared beliefs, experience and judgement suggests a "world view,"
which strongly affects the management of an organization.
Weick (1979) has also been very influential in developing this
"Manager as Sensemaker" school. His concept of "enactment" holds that
organizational members impose a cognitive structure on an ill-defined
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stream of organizational events, then act as if this mental model were
the true organizational reality.
Although Isenberg does not explicitly use the term, implicit in
some of his earlier work is the concept of "Manager as Organizational
Process Designer." In a study of 12 division managers, he found that
executives tend to think about problems of two kinds: (1) how to
create effective organizational processes, and (2) how to deal with
one or two critical issues, or very general goals (1984:82). These
findings roughly correspond to Kotter's networking and agenda building
activities.
Isenberg contends, as many previous studies have shown, that the
executive mind is "imperfectly rational." But, he says, the problem
with abandoning our rational ideal of management ignores the fact that
even if executives do not think systematically and logically,
organizations still must try to act rationally in pursuit of the
firm's goals. He concludes:
One alternative to the vain task of trying to rationalize
managers is to increase the rationality of organizational systems
and processes. Although organizational behavior is never
completely rational, managers can design and program processes
and systems that will approach rationality in resource allocation
and employment.
Decision support systems are one such source of
organizational rationality. These generally computerized
routines perform many functions ranging from providing a broad
and quantitative data base, to presenting that data base in
easily understandable form, to modeling the impact of decisions
on various financial and other criteria.... " (1984:88)
_____XIIIII·_l·_l__I__.__
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EVIDENCE FROM THE FIELD
It is overwhelmingly evident that the applications of
computer-based systems at senior management levels are diverse. Each
is targetted at fulfilling specific needs of a particular executive.
Yet the bulk of the applications which are viewed as successful by the
executives involved do appear to fall within one of the three
categories mentioned at the outset. The applications themselves are
reviewed in more depth elsewhere (De Long/Rockart forthcoming). For
purposes of this paper a brief summary of the type of computer use
found in each area is presented here.
Improving Office Systems
Efficiency applications, generally related to office automation,
are the first general category of ESS use. The most significant of
these is electronic mail. The CEO of a midwestern insurance company
claims his ESS has increased his productivity 10-15 percent. He uses
electronic mail daily to communicate with his subordinates, and finds
the system most useful for keeping in touch with his staff when he
travels.
A limited number of senior managers use word processing to draft
their own memos and speeches. A larger group keeps data about the
------ -
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organization's personnel and/or customers in a readily accessible
on-line file. And many are finding the computer's capability of
maintaining a "tickler" file or tracking correspondence to be quite
valuable. Systems which provide access to external information sources
(e.g., Dow Jones) are also included in this category.
These "efficiency applications," although limited in the
management functions which they provide, are becoming more and more
common. There are two prime reasons for this. First, they are being
marketed more actively by major computer vendors such as IBM (PROFS),
DEC (ALL-IN-ONE), and others. Second, to install them requires
relatively little management time.
Redeveloping Organizational Planning and Control Systems
By far the largest category of "successful" ESS are those
designed to improve the organization's planning and control processes.
These systems provide either new information to senior managers or
supply the existing data faster, in more detail, or in a more useful
format (e.g. graphics vs. tabular, or data plus text).
The most common benefit for executives is getting information on
actual performance faster from the firm's control system. One vice
president in a major aerospace company was frustrated with getting
30-day-old program cost data that had been heavily massaged by
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subordinates. An ESS now provides that data direct from the cost
collection system in two days. In another aerospace organization, the
general manager demanded and eventually received, despite obvious
foot-dragging on the part of many subordinates, daily data and
explanatory text concerning all changes in program status.
In a diversified electronics corporation, the president has
agreed on a standard set of monthly performance reports that both he
and his group vice presidents will receive. Thus, his monthly
meetings with them no longer involve arguments over who has the right
numbers. Instead, the focus is on more strategic questions dealing
with the performance and future of the divisions.
All of these ESS-driven changes in planning and control systems
alter the information flow in the organization. They, thus,
significantly affect the way in which the organization is managed.
These ESS require extensive thought and effort to be designed and
implemented well. But these systems appear to have clear payoffs both
in providing useful information for the executive and, probably more
significantly, conveying to the organization a sense of what is
important to that executive.
Enriching Mental Models
The enhancement of an executive's mental model was cited only
once in our case studies as the primary motivation for the development
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of an ESS. But it lurks in the background of many systems. Executives
have a high need to ensure that their conception of their business
environment is reasonably close to reality. The one executive for whom
improving his mental models was an explicit goal is a Ph.D. physicist
who heads a high technology firm. He has developed computer-based
models of his company's operations, the industries in which the firm
competed, and the U.S. economy. He first embedded his views in the
models and then adjusted his thinking in light of what he learned by
watching the flow of data through the models.
Alternately, one president of a small bank developed a system to
access and browse through current information on all the bank's
customer accounts. As a result, the bank president contends that he
has developed a much different sense of the dynamics and trends in his
business.
In another instance, the chairman of a large manufacturing firm
uses economic models he has had developed to test the company's sales
forecasts. This allows him to go back and challenge the assumptions
of his subordinates and helps ensure that their forecasts are as
realistic and accurate as possible.
EXECUTIVE WORK AND ESS
It is apparent the conceptions of top management work put forth
by Mintzberg, Anthony, Kotter, Jaques, and Isenberg and others provide
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some evidence to support the above conclusions about what is happening
with executive support systems. Let us examine the three major uses
of ESS in the context of the different conceptions of executive work
described earlier.
Support for Mental Models
Mintzberg, Kotter, Jaques, and Isenberg all provide insights into the
concept of executives' mental models. Mintzberg acknowledges the existence
and importance of mental models but, because his focus is on executive
activities, he does not try torelate the significance of mental models to an
understanding of executive work.
Kotter does not explicitly recognize the concept of mental models, but
his process view of executive work implicitly depends on the existence of
such a concept. Agenda building really offers an applied view, that is a
perspective on the development and uses of mental models. Like any model,
these cognitive agendas are constantly tested and refined as new feedback is
collected through the executive's network.
Executives begin the process of developing these agendas
immediately after starting their jobs, if not before. They use
their knowledge of the businesses and organizations involved
along with new information received each day to quickly develop
a rough agenda -- typically, this contains a very loosely
___·------^--·(-----·1_11 -----
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connected and incomplete set of objectives, along with a few
specific strategies and plans. Then over time, as more and more
information is gathered, they incrementally (one step at a time)
make the agendas more complete and more tightly connected.
...GMs make agenda-setting decisions both consciously (or
analytically) and unconsciously (or intuitively) in a process
that is largely internal to their minds. Indeed, important
agenda-setting decisions are often not observable (1982:161).
Isenberg makes the link between agendas and mental models when
he develops the case for "managerial cognition" as a critical element
in understanding executive work.
He points out that, "Kotter's (1982) notion of the manager's
agenda is by definition a cognitive structure for organizing the
manager's many tasks..." (1985:12)
Isenberg also observes:
...Managers have an organized mental map of all the
problems and issues facing them. The map is neither static nor
permanent; rather, managers continually test, correct, and
revise it. In the words of one CEO, the executive takes
advantage of the best cartography at his command, but knows that
that is not enough. He knows that along the way he will find
things that change his maps or alter his perceptions of the
terrain. He trains himself the best he can in the detective
skills. He is endlessly sending out patrols to learn greater
detail, overflying targets to get some sense of the general
battlefield." (1984:87)
"Manager as Sensemaker" is one of several views of managerial
thinking identified by Isenberg. This view, which focuses on how
executives impose cognitive structures, or mental maps, on their
environments, includes several different perspectives on cognitive
--------I ·- ---------------- 
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structure. Cognitive mapping is a complex and little understood
area, but one of increasing interest to management researchers. Our
case studies strongly suggest, however, that the process of building
and questioning the continuing validity of a top manager's mental
model is a major force in the development of many executive support
systems.
Jaques indirectly focuses on the critical importance of mental
models. He points out that the key cognitive difference between
level 3 departmental managers and level 4 general managers is, in
fact, the need for modeling at the fourth level. Identifying the
need for conceptual modeling at levels 4 and above helps explain why
some executive users would, consciously or unconsciously, try to
apply information technology to their model building processes.
Jaques' insights into the cognitive differences between levels of
management also suggest that differences should exist between
executive support systems and these designed for lower level
managers.
Reviewing the literature on executive work we learn several
things about mental models relevant to our understanding of ESS.
There seems to be agreement among researchers that the concept of
mental models is critical to understanding executive work. Kotter's
concept of agenda building would be impossible without it. And, in
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fact, Jaques seems to argue that the work of general managers
requires mental modeling.
Finally, it is somewhat ironic that Mintzberg, whose research on
one level seems to argue against executive computer use, was the
first to suggest that computer support could enrich top management
models of the business. Mintzberg's idea was that the technology
would be used by management scientists on the staff to help make the
executives' models more explicit, testable, and, thus, easier to
communicate. What he did not foresee was that executives would
actually be using the technology directly to help them think about
their businesses.
We know enough about mental models to talk about them as a
critical factor in executive work and, thus, ESS. Cognitive modeling
remains enough of a mystery, however, that consciously designing an
ESS to help enrich an executive's mental model is still very
difficult. To date, systems that do this have almost always been
designed with other more concrete goals in mind. Yet, in interviews,
many executives return time after time to points which indicate
significant ESS use to support or test their cognitive maps.
Improving Organizational Systems
Anthony, Mintzberg, Kotter and Isenberg all have something to
contribute to our understanding of how ESS are used to improve
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organizational systems. Early research in executive support
(Rockart/Treacy,1982) reported on the use of computer support by
individual executives. The first ESS were designed to support top
managers alone, with little regard for the system's impact on the
organization. Our recent research, however, indicates that this has
changed. Indeed, many of the systems perceived to be most successful
today are those that have affected changes in the organization's
planning and control processes.
Several of the roles identified by Mintzberg, specifically
entrepreneur, monitor, leader, disturbance handler, and resource
allocator, all clearly show a need for structured "hard" data.
However, standard reporting systems, usually covering from one month
to a year, are often inadequate for top management. As Jaques and
Kotter point out, top managers have a broader time horizon than that
covered by the average formal planning and control system. Executives
are interested in information that covers periods ranging from very
short term (1-30 days) to 20 years. Working with the newly available
information technology, many are striving to change both the
information they personally receive and that which is available and
disseminated through the organization. In this latter way, they are
changing the planning and control system.
There seem to be two reasons that improving organizational
systems is an objective of ESS. First, executives need more timely
)______11_1___1__1___---.-- ---
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and better quality data to fulfill today's increasingly demanding
roles of monitor and resource allocator. Speeding up the handling of
information closes the feedback loop identified by Anthony, and thus
increases control in these roles. Increased control can serve to
reduce uncertainty, an objective long ago identified by Cyert and
March (1963) as a fundamental objective in organizations. Nowhere is
managing under uncertainty more a factor than in top management
functions.
The second reason is that developing more rational
organizational systems enables top management to focus on other more
undefined and uncertain strategic issues. Isenberg says:
...Rational systems free senior executives to tackle the
ambiguous, ill-defined tasks that the human mind is uniquely
capable of addressing.
...In fact, it may seem paradoxical that managers need to
create rational systems in order to creatively and incrementally
tackle the nonrecurrent problems that defy systematic
approaches. (1984:89)
In one sense, the development of executive support systems can be
perceived as an attempt by management to rationalize through
automation as many of their tasks as possible. This allows more time
for the highly uncertain and non-systematic functions, which should
take up most of their time. There are some tasks which top managers
must periodically repeat, such as determining executive compensation,
or reviewing monthly sales figures, so systems are set up to support
^111_. 1-_11_ _1__.___.
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these tasks. The primary benefits are usually time saved and better
information available for decision making.
This reasoning has received support from other researchers.
Huber, for example, offers this related observation:
We recognize, of course, that a good deal of the information
relevant to top management will not be available through
computers. Certainly a good deal of politically or socially
sensative information will not. What C [computers and
communications] technology will do, however, is reduce the amount
of time needed to scan less sensitive environments and thus
produce more time for chats and gossip sessions that provide the
soft and sensitive information that the manager needs to complete
his or her mental model. (1984:947)
Huber recognizes the link between organizational systems and
mental models. One of the important insights from our research is
that executives are using ESS to communicate their own mental models
of the business to the rest of the organization, usually by changing
the planning and control systems. These enhanced systems, in turn,
help enrich the executive's mental model. Thus, it is an interactive
process. Developing an ESS to improve planning and control processes
will often enhance the top manager's way of thinking about the
business which will, in turn, lead to the development or better
systems which further enhance the mental model.
· _ I· I I__ _B__I________________1__1_____1___1___
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Office Applications
Many researchers have reported on the time pressures executives
experience. But, unlike with mental models and organizational
systems, management theorists doing research on executive work have
had little to say explicitly about improving efficiency or
effectiveness at the top management level through improved office
systems.
It is ironic, therefore, that improving routine office workings
is the area that so far has received the most attention from ESS
developers and computer vendors. Perhaps, this is because "saving
time" is the need executives can most easily articulate to their I/S
departments. For whatever reason, making the executive more efficient
has become the initial objective of many ESS projects.
These applications, which generally fall into the domain of
office automation, usually do one of two things for the users: (1)
improve communications, or (2) help organize information.
Virtually all of Mintzberg's roles argue for communications
support. Communications also pervades Anthony's framework for
planning and control, and Kotter's concept of developing a network
inherently implies a need to improve communications
capabilities. Given these needs for better communication, it should
not be surprising that electronic mail is one of the most common ESS
applications.
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Mintzberg also recognizes that information continually "bombards"
the executive. Thus, help in organizing this information is one form
of support that is needed. In like manner, Isenberg contends that
executives try to rationalize organizational systems. This particular
tendency would logically extend to their own personal support
systems. Tickler files, automated Roladexes, electronic
mail,calendaring, and word processing are all evidence of this drive
to rationalize as many personal systems as possible.
CONCLUSION
The views we hold of executive work greatly influence how we
think about executive support systems (Treacy and De Long, 1985).
Reviewing the literature on top management work serves two purposes.
First, it can point to areas in which computer-based systems can
logically aid managers. Second, reviewing the literature can help ESS
researchers, developers, and users become more conscious of the
implicit models they have of the executive function. Only by making
these beliefs explicit can we begin to reflect on their influence on
ESS design.
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